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This rapid review synthesises the literature from academic, policy, and knowledge institution 
sources on how taxation can be effectively used as an instrument for accountability and 
responsiveness by governments in Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs). The review 
concludes that there is sufficient evidence that links taxation with accountability. However, this 
does not mean that such outcomes are always guaranteed; taxation does not automatically 
translate into higher government responsiveness and accountability through tax bargaining 
processes in which citizens and business actors engage with state actors. For a positive 
outcome to happen, tax policy and donor-led interventions need to focus merely on building 
forums where tax bargaining can happen, civil society support, tax communication strategies 
towards citizens, strengthening taxpayers’ rights, horizontal equity in tax collection, and 
strengthen direct taxes.  
Prichard (2015) distinguishes three dimensions of tax bargaining. First, direct tax bargaining as 
explicit concessions to taxpayers from governments in the process of implementing tax reforms. 
Second, tax resistance and changes in government which means that taxpayers resist to pay 
taxes. Third, expanding the political capabilities of taxpayers to mobilise new civil society 
actors and business associations, which strengthen the voice of the taxpayers to push for 
responsiveness and accountability. Because the literature is clear that empirical evidence 
supports the theory that links taxation with accountability, this rapid review focuses on four 
dimensions, which explain in more details this link. 
 In the presence of high natural resource rents, leaders lower the burden of taxation on 
citizens in order to reduce the demand for democratic accountability. Some research 
shows that oil wealth only became a hindrance to democratic transitions after the 1970s 
and that an increase in resource dependence in an autocratic country has different 
outcomes on accountability than in a democratic country. 
 Over the years, foreign aid has been linked with limiting the urgency to tax citizens. 
However, research shows that foreign aid works for accountability when existing political 
institutions are already strong in the recipient country and that a push for 
democratisation interventions (e.g. free press and democratic political parties) in 
combination with tax interventions can increase voice and accountability. 
 There is empirical evidence that tax bargaining happens prior and after tax reforms or tax 
increases, with cases from Somaliland, Kenya, Ghana and Sierra Leone mentioned in 
this rapid review. Tax bargaining happens on the national and sub-national levels, 
mainly through civil society or business associations’ involvement.  
 Tax-compliance attitudes are important levellers for accountability. Increasing citizens’ 
trust in governments to achieve improvements in public services is key. Research shows 
that taxpayers react differently to their loss of income. For example, psychological 
ownership over public money drives governance expectations. When citizens have 
higher expectations, they significantly increase their demands on leaders. 
Furthermore, tax-compliance is weak when governments allow tax avoidance and many 
tax exemptions, citizens are involved in frequent payment to non-state actors in 
exchange for security, and when individual’s perception is that the state is unfairly 
treating their own ethnic group. 
The literature refers to two types of concern related to tax bargaining: 
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 Tax bargaining can easily increase inequalities as most powerful taxpayers in 
LMICs are better educated, living in urban areas and with higher incomes. 
Interventions that aim to increase accountability through processes of tax bargaining, 
therefore must take into account this risk. The literature is in favour of horizontal tax 
collection, which includes the poor, by creating tax bargaining forums and interactive 
communication channels to increase tax-compliance among the whole population. 
 On the sub-national level there are more barriers for effective tax bargaining. Local 
governments often have very little capacity, and weak incentives to collect revenue. They 
can be more predatory, amidst low-income populations, weak controls and elite 
domination. And, opportunities for collective action in response to taxation at the local 
government level is often weaker.  
At the end of this rapid review some lessons learned are shared from case studies and other 
evidence related to tax interventions and tax reforms that aim to increase accountability and 
responsiveness. It shows that interventions should seek engagement with citizens and non-
state actors (e.g. chiefs, religious leaders, civil society, business associations), achieve 
meaningful transparency on tax spending and revenues, and build effective forums where 
tax bargaining can take place.  
Most of the literature used in this rapid review comes from academic empirical research in 
LMICs, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. Overall the literature shows that to measure such 
improvements in accountability can be achieved by looking at changes in popular levels 
of political knowledge, political engagement and attitudes towards tax compliance. Finally, 
the literature was not abundant in highlighting specific gender issues.  
2. Framing the debate about taxation and improved 
governance 
As Moore, Prichard and Fjeldstad (2018, p.182) mention in their book ‘Taxing Africa’ the once 
“controversial” idea that taxation could drive state building and improved governance, is now well 
accepted: 
“It is assumed either that governments that are dependent only on taxes for revenue are 
likely to be more accountable to taxpayer, or that tax increases will generate more 
accountability and a stronger social contract.” 
This assumption is mostly based on the history of state-building in Europe and the United States 
(e.g. captured in the American phrase “No taxation without representation”), but more recently it 
has been increasingly used in the context of Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs). In the 
context of LMICs, governance and accountability levels have been linked with the reliance of 
governments on natural resources or foreign aid to increase revenues. Although debatable, there 
is a strong case that dependence on foreign aid and natural resources limits governments’ 
urgency for transparency and scrutiny on public spending (McGuirk, 2013; Asongu, 2015; Cuesta 
et al., 2018).  
Prichard (2010, p.13) conceptualised three different ways in which governments’ needs to tax 
may drive improved governance: 
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 Common interest processes: If governments are dependent on taxes, they 
automatically depend on the prosperity of taxpayers and therefore on economic growth. 
This implies the assumption that the incentive to increase taxpayers’ wealth requires 
improved governance.1  
 State apparatus processes: This is the process of complex tax collection, which 
assumes a strong tax agency that collaborates effectively with other government 
agencies. In this case, the tax agency can push (e.g. through demonstration, spillover, 
and information-sharing effects: Moore, Prichard & Fjeldstad, 2018) for improvements in 
public administration, such as justice, land rights and public service delivery.2 
 Accountability and responsiveness processes: This is the process where 
governments feel the pressure from taxpayers to improve public services in reciprocity for 
raising taxes, also referred to as “tax bargaining” (Moore, 2008). As Cuesta et al. (2018, 
p.1) state: “feelings of ownership over public revenues significantly increase citizens’ 
demands on leaders”. 
This rapid literature review will mainly focus on the third point of accountability and 
responsiveness. Moore, Prichard and Fjeldstad (2018) mention that most attention in research, in 
particular for the context of LMICs, focuses on explaining the link between taxation and 
accountability through tax bargaining with citizens. However, tax bargaining is not a well-
established roundtable dialogue between respective stakeholders, but rather a “messier, and 
more conflictual, reality of politics” (Moore, Prichard & Fjeldstad, 2018, p.187). Prichard (2015) 
distinguishes three dimensions of tax bargaining (see also figure 1): 
 Direct tax bargaining: This is referred to as explicit concessions to taxpayers from 
governments in the process of implementing tax reforms. This can be prior to tax reforms 
or as a reaction against popular protests. 
 Tax resistance and changes in government: In this case taxpayers resist to pay taxes, 
especially in the situation of non-transparent and unpopular governments, leading to 
conflict and reduced revenue in the short term, but with a chance of pushing for new 
elections to pressure a new government. 
 Expand the political capabilities of taxpayers: This is when governments neglect the 
signals of public discontent on tax issues. This could provoke the mobilisation of new civil 
                                                   
1 In Moore, Prichard and Fjeldstad (2018) mention that there is little research evidence for this common interest 
process. Some research from China shows that “when national tax policy changes made local governments more 
reliant on their own tax revenue, they responded by making more efforts to accelerate local economic growth” 
(Jin et al., 2005 – cited from: Moore, Prichard and Fjeldstad, 2018, p.188). They also mention Callen et al. (2014) 
who shows that some oil-producing countries are looking to diversify economic growth due to declining oil 
revenues (ibid). However, Moore, Prichard and Fjeldstad (2018) also mention that this need to tax does not 
necessarily relate to good governance, and mostly results in short-termism to increase revenue (ibid). 
2 Moore, Prichard and Fjeldstad (2018, p.189) refer to this process as “taxation and state building”. They mention 
that this link was rooted in historical experience from Europe, but that less is known about this process in LMICs, 
in particular in Africa. They argue that for this process to happen, there must already be some basis for robust 
government institutions embedded in a culture of trust. Some studies confirm these processes in Rwanda 
(Moore, 2014), Uganda (Goodfellow & Owen), South Africa (Pieterse et al., 2016) and Sierra Leone (Saka, 2017) 
(all cited from: Moore, Prichard & Fjeldstad, 2018). However, the reality is often that success of revenue agencies 
is linked with their independent position from government, which has increased the distance with the rest of 
government (ibid).   
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society actors and business associations, which strengthen the voice of the taxpayers to 
push for responsiveness and accountability. 





The theoretical literature also shows that tax bargaining will only work if there is some level of 
trust or common ground between citizens and the government. For example, the political 
legitimacy theory shows that taxpayers are only willing to pay more tax if there is to some extent 
trust or belief in the authorities, institutions and social arrangements (Ali, Fjeldstad, Sjursen, 
2013). This trust is mainly related to the capability of governments to deliver improved public 
services to taxpayers. 
3. Evidence on the link between taxation and 
accountability  
Empirical research has been looking for evidence that can prove the theory of the link between 
taxation and an improved state-citizen social contract in LMICs. Overall, they confirm that 
processes of accountability and responsiveness are happening in LMICs instigated by taxation.  
 Asongu’s (2014) empirical study that includes data from African countries for the period 
1996-2010, shows that the effect of taxation on political stability and governance is 
significantly consistent. In this study, combining taxation with press freedom improves 
political governance and accountability even further.  
 Also Baskaran (2014) shows with data from 122 countries over the period 1981-2008 that 
dependence on tax revenues had on average a “mild positive effect” on democracy. 
Improvements in the state’s capacity to tax citizens, therefore could result in more 
democracy in LMICs. Baskaran (2014) measures that an increase in government 
revenues by one percentage point increases the democracy score by about 0.4 points. 
This means that if Rwanda with an average government revenues to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) ratio of 18.6%, were to increase its level of revenues to that of 
Switzerland, (33.84%), it could improve its democracy score by around 6.1 points (ibid).  
 Baskaran and Bigsten (2013) show that the state’s ability to tax citizens eventually leads 
to more democratic and less corrupt governments for sub-Saharan African countries. 
They conducted the empirical analysis with data covering 23 African countries over the 
1960-2008 period. The results suggest that investing in fiscal capacity, in particular by 
expanding direct taxation, could lead to more accountable governments. Therefore, 
Baskaran and Bigsten (2013) conclude that donors need to address governance and 
fiscal capacity simultaneously. The authors make an interesting point about eventual 
limitations on this link in sub-Saharan Africa because of the delink of the fiscal authorities 
from governments. The idea behind delinking the tax agencies from the finance ministry 
was to de-politicise tax administration and to make it more efficient, in particular by 
paying higher salaries than in other branches of the public sector. However, as Baskaran 
and Bigsten (2013, p.9) state: “While it is contentious whether these revenue authorities 
have indeed improved the quality of tax administration, the fact that they are only 
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indirectly accountable to the finance ministry and other political institutions may mean 
that their emergence may have weakened the link between fiscal capacity and 
accountability”.  
In the next sections this rapid review digs more in details to this evidence in four different ways. 
First, by taking account of the influence of natural resources on the link between taxation and 
accountability Second, by doing the same for the influence of foreign aid. Third, it will look for the 
available evidence on the existence of tax bargaining and tax-compliance attitudes. Finally, it will 
have a close look at the evidence on the role of decentralisation processes to explain the link 
between taxation and accountability. 
1. Natural resources 
There is an abundance in empirical research that shows that a low tax to GDP rate in natural 
resource rich LMICs is an important determinant to explain the lack of democratic state building 
and accountability in these countries.  
 Andersen and Ross (2014) show by comparing data from oil producing and non-oil 
producing LMICs that oil wealth only became a hindrance to democratic transitions 
after the 1970s. They conclude that after the 1970s independent governments in LMICs 
were able to capture the oil rents that were previously used by foreign-owned firms. The 
authors, therefore, show that studies that doubt the correlation between democratisation 
and dependency on natural resources only have a point from a historical perspective. 
This evidence that independent governments with access to oil rents lack the same 
democratic progress as non-oil producing countries’ governments, but only since they 
have access to these revenues, is an indication that taxation matters for accountability.  
 McGuirk’s (2013) paper confirms this with data from 15 sub-Saharan African countries 
using micro-level data on natural resource rents. The evidence shows that in the 
presence of high natural resource rents, leaders lower the burden of taxation on 
citizens in order to reduce the demand for democratic accountability. Furthermore, 
the analysis shows that this effect becomes more acute before national elections, 
reducing tax enforcement as elections become more proximate. It concludes that: 
“Although the vital importance of democratic accountability as an accompaniment to 
electoral competition cannot be understated for any sub-Saharan African country, it 
should be noted that resource-rich countries are particularly prone to institutional 
deterioration as a result of citizen acquiescence purchased by a reduction in the tax 
burden—where checks and balances are most needed, they are perhaps at their most 
delicate” (McGuirk, 2013, p.310). 
 Another study used meta-data from 166 countries to find a link between natural resource 
dependency for revenue and the level of democracy and accountability. It concludes that 
an increase in resource dependence in an autocratic country has different 
outcomes than in a democratic country (Wiens, Poast & Clark, 2014). The evidence 
presented in their paper shows that only in an autocratic country natural resource 
dependency tend to decrease the “democratic emergence”, while they do not find effects 
of “democratic survival” of countries with a well-established democracy. This means that 
the probability that autocracies move to a democratic transition is reduced with resource 
dependence. On the other hand, these outcomes show that countries with democratic 
institutional mechanisms in place, can remain accountable to their citizens while 
increasing their revenues through natural resources.  
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 Devarajan, Raballand and Le (2011, p.2) show that it are indeed mainly natural resource 
rich LMICs that are trapped in a vicious circle of “low taxation on citizens, which implies 
less accountability and public scrutiny of public spending and low efficiency and poor 
service delivery, which further limits possibilities to tax citizens”. Their evidence not only 
confirms the theory that higher citizens’ scrutiny and demand for good governance is 
associated with taxation, the study also calculates a threshold at which levels of 
taxation are resulting in voice and accountability improvements related to public 
spending of about 49% of GDP. Devarajan, Raballand and Le (2011, p.15-16) state 
that because the public spending to GDP ratio in most LMICs is far below this level, one 
can assume that “most of them are situated on the rising part of the relationship where 
increases in the level of taxation are associated with more accountability”. However, 
because natural resource dependence is a constraint to follow this path, the authors 
propose a scheme of redistributing a share of oil revenues and then taxing citizens to be 
able to break the vicious circle prevalent in oil-rich economies and lead to better public 
spending outcomes. 
 The previous proposal of Devarajan, Raballand and Le (2011) is in line with a proposal of 
Cuesta et al. (2018) to increase citizens’ psychological ownership over non-earned 
revenues like aid and oil, and that this induces untaxed subjects to demand 
accountability similar to that of taxed subjects. 
Overall, there is a common sense in the literature that there is enough evidence to support the 
theory that natural resource dependence is a constraint for democratisation and accountability 
due to a lack in urgency for a fiscal contract between the state and the citizens.  
2. Foreign aid 
There is much more debate about how foreign aid affects the link between taxation and 
accountability. Eubank (2012) looks at the case of Somaliland. This state is an interesting case, 
because Somaliland is seen as a secessionist state and therefore was not eligible for foreign 
assistance. Furthermore, Somaliland has few natural resources revenues, which resulted in a tax 
bargaining process between state and non-state actors. Eubank (2012), therefore, concludes 
that the urgency of Somaliland’s new government after independence to include a system 
of both fiscal and political decentralisation measures was critical to establish peace and 
cooperation. In forcing the development of institutions, tax bargaining provided citizens with an 
ongoing mechanism for enforcing arrangements.  
Tax bargaining in Somaliland was based on two levels (Eubank, 2012): 
 The government had to negotiate with rival groups to take a share in the control of the 
important port of Berbera and its potential revenues through trade.  
 Eubank (2012) highlights the importance of the cooperative management of grazing 
lands and water resources in Somaliland, which has a strong impetus for cooperation 
between local communities and which is more difficult to control by the government in 
comparison with an economy based on natural resources.  
In an exercise to show the importance the lack of alternative revenue sources for the government 
of Somaliland had on tax bargaining, Eubank (2012) measures that if the country was eligible to 
receive foreign aid after independence, the government would have received a substantial 
amount of foreign assistance, which Eubank estimates at US$70.5 million till 2001 (10 years after 
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independence). A significant amount of revenue which, according to Eubank, could have 
changed the prospect of the state’s need for seeking bargaining with local communities and 
factions within the society.  
Asongu’s (2014) empirical study on Africa concludes that foreign aid is instrumental only 
when existing political institutions are already strong in the recipient country. Only in that 
case LMIC governments are using foreign aid to improve public services, while combining it with 
taxation. This result suggests that institutions need to mature (time) and be strong (level) through 
processes of tax bargaining before the beneficial effects of foreign aid in transforming political 
institutions could be achieved (Asongu, 2014). In countries with less strong institutions, the 
evidence shows that the abundance of foreign aid will not translate in accountability and state 
building as it will affect taxation efforts with the probability of establishing tax bargaining 
processes.  
Bermeo (2011) shows another distinction as he concludes (by using data for the period from 
1992 to 2007 for LMICs) that only aid from democratic donors is found to be associated 
with an increase in the likelihood of a democratic transition as they emphasise voice and 
accountability. This suggests that the efforts by democratic donors to combine governance with 
fiscal capacities for example with the aim to broaden the tax base could be a tool to establish a 
fiscal contract and tax bargaining. That is indeed the conclusion of Baskaran (2014). The study 
includes 122 countries and finds that there is a link between taxation and accountability. By 
looking at how foreign aid affects these outcomes Baskaran shows that donors can push for 
more democracy in combination with tax revenues, which together has a significant 
positive effect on accountability. Therefore, investing in tax capacity not only increases the 
amount of revenues, but may also result in more accountable governments. A check on different 
regions shows that these results are particularly strong for sub-Saharan African countries 
(Baskaran, 2014). 
3. Tax bargaining and tax-compliance attitudes 
The above-mentioned academic studies all tend towards more fine-grained testing of the 
relationship between taxation and accountability itself. However, there are also studies that dig 
deeper in questions like how to foster preferable outcomes. Empirical studies that focus on 
explaining the processes of tax bargaining and how these processes come to different outcomes 
are sparse. One of the most important studies in this area is from Prichard (2015). For example, 
Prichard (2015) case study on Ghana shows empirical evidence for the emergence of tax 
bargaining processes after the government of Ghana became more reliant on taxation for 
revenue since the 1990s. Prichard (2015, p.) states:  
“Most notably, the case highlights the importance of taxpayer capacity for collective 
action and the existence of institutions for tax bargaining in shaping outcomes. During the 
1980s tax bargaining was essentially non-existent, owing to a combination of a 
repressive government, weak civil society and divided elites. As new political space 
opened, civil society grew stronger, opposition elites became more unified, and tax 
bargaining became more common and meaningful from the 1990s onward. Meanwhile, 
the creation of new democratic and consultative institutions – that is, institutions for tax 
bargaining – from 1996 onwards saw tax bargaining shift away from highly 
confrontational protests towards more institutionalized forms of bargaining.” 
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Since the early 1980s, Ghana’s government was desperately in need to expand the fiscal 
capacity of the state after revenues from the export of cocoa fell short. As part of the structural 
economic reforms the government pushed for tax reforms and higher taxation, resulting in higher 
tax collection; however, without any concern for any potential political consequences. The higher 
tax collection resulted in tax protests and demands for democratisation in the early 1990s 
(Prichard, 2015). The protests were initially a response to the introduction of VAT, but quickly 
developed to demand for political liberalisation. The government withheld the introduction of 
VAT, but as Prichard (2015) illustrate in further details, the role of civil society and opposition 
parties in organising the protests was a clear message to any future government to facilitate 
bargaining and dialogue efforts in new tax policies. New governments indeed engaged with the 
Parliament and used other forms of tax bargaining with civil society and business associations, 
which has created more transparency and accountability on tax revenue and public spending. In 
particular, governments used tax earmarking and government responsiveness (pre-
emptive forms of tax bargaining) to ensure implementation of tax reforms (Prichard, 2015). 
For example, a percentage of revenues are being earmarked for a particular purpose, like for 
youth employment, road infrastructure improvements or for recruiting more teachers.    
Although this form of tax bargaining increased voice and responsiveness of government, there 
are some concerns on how effective it was for accountability. Prichard (2015) refers to the risk 
that the government may announce that funds are being earmarked for a particular purpose, but 
fail to follow through on that promise in practice. This was the case for the Communications Tax, 
as the public was led to believe that revenues would be earmarked for the Youth Employment 
Scheme, but in practice only a small share of revenue was allocated to that programme. Another 
concern is that earmarking is benefitting popular programmes, while other less catchy but 
important programmes will suffer from less attention. 
In the case study on Kenya, Prichard (2015) shows a different form of tax bargaining. There has 
been little evidence of direct tax bargaining historically in Kenya. However, Prichard (2015) 
explains Kenya’s history of indirect tax bargaining, in particular the ability of taxpayers to resist 
taxation by unpopular governments, which has created pressure on governments for 
increased responsiveness and accountability as tax revenues plummeted. This was 
particularly the case in the early 2000s during the Moi government. After the elections in 2002, 
the new government reacted by introducing a clearer link between taxes and expenditures in 
order to secure improved tax compliance and collection (Prichard,, 2015). Later in 2007 during 
the outbreak of violence following the elections it were business associations who pushed the 
government for a peaceful settlement as they used their status as taxpayers by explicitly 
threatening to withhold tax revenue if the government failed to make peace (Prichard, 2015). 
Prichard (2015, p.) states: “While there were diverse factors that contributed to the resolution of 
the post-election crisis, many observers feel that the role of the business community was 
significant, and that the need to sustain tax revenue played an important part in pushing the 
government towards peace.” 
In Kenya the role of civil society in tax bargaining is also evident in the establishment of the 
National Taxpayers’ Association, an initiative of the Centre for Governance and Development, 
and the Kenya Alliance of Resident Associations (KARA). The first is working to strengthen 
public understanding of existing tax burdens and of the connection between taxes and public 
spending, while the latter tries to connect and support residents’ associations in their demands 
that tax payment provides residents with a basis for demanding improved performance from 
government (Prichard, 2015). It is used as a strategy for mobilising public advocacy and brings 
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an official body to the voice of taxpayers that they can use in tax bargaining with the Kenyan 
government.  
The evidence from Prichard (2015) is in line with literature on tax bargaining in exchange for 
accountability in Latin America. Mahon (2018) shows that in Latin America there was some form 
of tax bargaining after tax reforms, which increased accountability, however, this agenda was 
effectively pushed by the IMF as an external actor in the 1980s and 1990s instead of internal 
actors. Mahon (2018) also shows that Latin America’s governments continued to serve mainly 
the elites over tax policy. The elite pursued individualistic strategies, such as tax evasion or the 
pursuit of exemptions, rather than looking for broader, universal and institutional reforms. This is 
in contrast with collective tax bargaining. On the other hand, the redistribution policies in large 
part of Latin America since the 2000s can be seen as politicians seeking election by 
responding to the demands (often through protests) of a growing urban population, facing 
uncertainties, violence and income volatility (Mahon, 2018). Mahon (2018) shows that this 
latest response is in line with the fiscal-contract logic while this was less the case in the 1990s. 
However, he also shows that the growth of tax revenues in Latin America, which has created 
fiscal space for new social spending, has been based largely on non-progressive indirect 
taxation, which theoretically could have limited the demands for tax bargaining. 
To add to the complexity of tax bargaining, an emerging topic in the literature on taxation and 
accountability focuses on citizens’ tax-compliance attitude: what drives citizens to pay tax and 
under what conditions. Ali, Fjeldstad and Sjursen (2014) show in their paper that citizens’ tax-
compliance attitude in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa is positively correlated 
with provision of public services. The results show that: 
 When taxpayers’ perception is that evading taxes has become more difficult, they are 
more likely to increase tax-compliance attitude, but they are more likely to do this if they 
can press for a fiscal contract to demand transparency and accountability on tax 
spending.  
 Tax knowledge and awareness are found to be positively correlated with tax-compliance 
attitude.  
 When citizens are involved in frequent payment to non-state actors in exchange for 
security and when individual’s perception is that the state is unfairly treating their own 
ethnic group, this correlates negatively with tax-compliance attitudes.  
Ali, Fjeldstad and Sjursen (2014) also show that the outcomes are different depending on the 
specific demand for services in countries: 
 In Tanzania and Uganda, they show that individuals who are satisfied with the 
government’s provision of basic health services and educational needs are more likely to 
have a tax compliant attitude.  
 In Kenya, individuals who are more satisfied with government provision of infrastructure, 
such as roads and electricity, are more likely to have tax compliant attitude.  
 In addition to basic health services and education, satisfaction with government’s 
handling of security is found to increase the likelihood of having a compliant attitude in 
Uganda.  
 In South Africa, individuals who are more satisfied with the ease of getting various 
services from the government, such as issuing of identity cards and obtaining household 
and police services are more likely to have a tax-compliant attitude.  
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This shows that governments can increase compliance by providing goods and services that 
citizens demand in a more efficient and accessible manner. This is important for policy-makers in 
their attempts to broaden the tax base and improve tax enforcement. 
The study of Cuesta et al. (2014) also looks at the causal dynamics that drive citizen demands 
for services from different revenue sources. Their results show that psychological ownership over 
public money drives governance expectations. The study demonstrates that high feelings of 
ownership over public revenues significantly increase citizens’ demands on leaders. This 
relates to Gottlieb (2016) who explains that citizens’ willingness to take costly political action in 
pursuit of better services are mainly related to the expectations of government performance and 
less to absolute performance: citizens are most likely to sanction when their expectations are 
high but not being met  (Gottlieb, 2016).  
To bring this in perspective of LMICs where expectations are “extremely low” this explains why 
citizens are less likely to complain as they face poor services and corruption scandals. However, 
on a positive note, Gottlieb (2016) also shows that improving citizens’ perception of government 
capacity can increase citizens’ expectations and therefore increase the likelihood of action. Or in 
the case of Cuesta et al. (2018, p.1), psychological ownership drives governance expectations: 
“when individuals have legal or psychological ownership over a good, they expect to benefit more 
from it and are more willing to punish allocations that they perceive as unfair”. These results are 
important to shape policy that creates more feeling of ownership on tax interventions as 
citizens with high psychological ownership over the government budget will have higher 
expectations for how much they should benefit from government spending. Poor 
government performance generates negative emotions in citizens with high expectations, and 
these negative emotions are then alleviated through demanding accountability from those 
responsible.  
This is in line with Martin (2016, p.1), although he argues that citizens’ action to punish 
governments for taxation increases is driven mainly by loss aversion mechanisms. He states: “By 
taking away earned income, taxation pushes loss-averse citizens below their reference point, 
increasing the utility citizens lose from non-accountable government behaviour and making them 
more likely to enact costly sanctions against officials”. Martin (2016) has evidence from Uganda, 
where he demonstrates that taxation increases politically-active Ugandans’ willingness to punish 
corruption. As few accountability-building interventions have been successful, even in the short 
term this paper showed that taxation can increase citizens’ willingness to punish governance 
failures, improving leader’s incentives to provide citizens’ preferred policies and services. By 
changing expectations, taxation makes citizens less tolerant of corruption or poor service 
provision and increases the benefit of punishment relative to the cost.  
4. Decentralisation 
There is also robust evidence that shows the link between taxation, accountability and 
responsiveness on decentralised government levels. The theoretical literature mentions that 
governments on sub-national levels are providing more visible public services to the citizens in 
education, drinking water and health on which to build tax compliance related to improved 
services. On the other hand, the literature also mentions the barriers of collective action on the 
local level (Moore, Prichard & Fjeldstad, 2018). The literature is divided how much benefit 
revenue autonomy on sub-national levels has on accountability and the provision of public 
services. Although local governments are more visibly in providing public services and therefore 
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more likely to seek forms of tax bargaining, such success would depend on various outstanding 
issues (Prichard, 2016):  
 Local governments often have very little capacity, and weak incentives to collect 
revenue. Not only do local government often lack technical capacity, but because they 
rely very heavily on financial transfers from central government they generally have 
limited incentives to collect revenue locally. Indeed, some observers have suggested that 
central governments have sometimes designed local fiscal systems precisely to limit local 
fiscal autonomy and engagement between citizens and governments.  
 Local government taxation can be “predatory”, amidst low-income populations 
and elite domination. Where taxation systematically targets those who are most 
vulnerable, and application of tax rules – particularly to elites – is inconsistent, this 
undermines the potential for productive bargaining over taxation. Extensive systems of 
informal taxation at the local government level may complicate the potential for 
bargaining and state-building even more.  
 There are significant barriers to collective action in response to taxation at the 
local government level. The weakness, fragmentation and politicisation of potential 
taxpayer representatives – including local business associations or market associations – 
as well as the lack of institutional spaces for taxpayers to engage with governments, may 
make it difficult for taxpayers to make collective demands for reciprocity from 
governments. 
As Sagono (2019) shows, there is evidence that citizens’ demand for better accountability and 
improved services are more likely to happen in local democracies that already function effectively 
and local authorities that already have substantial revenue autonomy and power in allocating 
resources. This section of the rapid literature review, suggests that there is indeed evidence from 
Indonesia, Brazil and Colombia to show more positive accountability effects on tax autonomy on 
the local level than from sub-Saharan Africa.  
However, as Sagono’s (2017) evidence from Cote d’Ivoir shows, revenue autonomy for 
municipalities have increased access to education, although the effect was less for health, water 
and sanitation services. The results also show that this positive link between taxation and public 
services is more likely to happen in densely urban areas than in rural municipalities. Also, the 
effect is less in ethnically diverse localities. Gadenne (2017) shows the same relationship for 
Brazilian municipalities. Municipalities that raise local tax revenues as a result of capacity 
building programmes not only increase their tax revenues but also are able to improve 
both the quantity and quality of the municipal education infrastructure. However, in cases 
where instead grants were given no impact was measured. Neither tax nor transfer revenues 
have a significantly positive impact on municipal health infrastructure. Both studies do not look at 
tax bargaining as the main contributor for public services improvement. 
The study of Paler (2013) on Indonesia gives more such evidence on the existence of tax 
bargaining. The results of her study show that citizens in areas of high taxation were more willing 
to monitor the budget and take action against the district governments than citizens in areas 
where revenues came mainly from other sources. Paler (2013) concludes that citizens have 
greater incentives to take action when government depends on their taxes rather than on 
windfalls. The study furthermore shows that citizens in high taxation districts, but in a low 
information environment were also more likely than those in the windfall treatment areas to 
pressure district governments for better performance. This supports the idea that taxation 
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enhances the demand for information. This shows the willingness of citizens to ask for 
transparency when they feel more ownership of tax revenues. However, there is a limit, 
according to Paler (2013, p.): “Interestingly, the fact that the tax treatment had a positive effect 
on monitoring but not on more overt types of political mobilization suggests a variation in how 
individuals assess the costs and benefits of different types of political engagement.”  
In line with these findings from Indonesia, a study from Colombia shows that municipalities that 
rely on taxation instead of natural resources (royalties from oil extraction) to provide for public 
services are more accountable and responsive and less corrupt (Martinez, 2016). Martinez 
(2016) find that an increase in property tax revenue has had a positive effect on several 
basic public services in the areas of education, health and water. These effects are at least 
ten times larger than the effects of an equivalent increase in oil royalties. Despite oil royalties 
earmarked for improvements in public services, this study does find no evidence of such 
improvements. Martinez (2016) also shows that additional oil royalties increase the probability 
that the mayor and other local public officials are prosecuted, found guilty, and removed from 
office due to corruption or wrong doing (mainly related to irregularities in investment and 
procurement and of processes related to natural resource royalties). The author, therefore, 
provides suggestive evidence that there is a positive effect of taxation on citizen demands 
regarding public services as the cause of this relation. The study concludes that accountability is 
crucial for the responsible management of public funds and that taxation is an effective way of 
achieving the necessary citizen involvement in public affairs.  
Although far less evidence seems to come from sub-Saharan Africa, some studies specific on 
property taxes show the existence of tax bargaining mechanisms. Goodfellow and Owen (2018) 
show, for example, that a local commercial property tax in Nigeria’s Lagos sparked a fierce 
response from the private sector, which resulted in a radical reducing in the tax rates for 
commercial properties. The consequence was that the tax was capturing far more properties. 
However, there were also bottom-up responses that resulted in the willingness to comply to pay 
the tax. In low-income communities, the study found a clear link between paying the tax 
and the increase in moral pressure on the authorities to deliver on its promises of a more 
secure and better-serviced future. Taxation resulted in building property rights demands for 
the poor communities. As Goodwell and Owen mention, because legal frameworks concerning 
land rights and tenure are inadequate and ambiguous, property tax itself can come to form one of 
the elements in demanding, building and maintaining such right. 
These conclusions are in line with the forthcoming publication of Prichard, Jibao and Orgeira on 
the impact of local property tax reforms on tax bargaining in Sierra Leone. There is enough 
evidence to support that tax bargaining can be linked with expanded responsiveness and 
accountability on the local level. This is not only related to link higher revenues from property 
taxation with better service outcomes, but the data shows that this is underpinned with 
interactions between taxpayers and governments, which suggest the existence of tax bargaining.   
With respect to the “tax resistance” pathway, Prichard, Jibao and Orgeira (forthcoming) find 
consistent evidence that tax morale declines in aggregate among taxpayers in treatment districts, 
putting pressure on governments to improve performance. The results, show that support for tax 
compliance becomes far more conditional on whether the government provides public benefits in 
return. On the “mobilisation” pathway, as another route for tax bargaining, the researchers find 
consistent evidence of very large effects of the treatment on levels of political knowledge 
among respondents as a form of expanded political engagement and mobilisation, and a 
potential precursor to other forms of political action (Prichard, Jibao & Orgeira, forthcoming).  
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In the debate about tax autonomy for local authorities, there are two issues relevant to increase 
local tax revenues through accountability and responsiveness:  
 In the tax debate there is still not enough insights how much tax pressure there is 
on citizens, as they often pay informal taxes on top of official taxes. Jibao, Prichard 
and Van den Boogaard (2017) show for Sierra Leone that taxpayers were more likely to 
perceive the rate of taxation to be too high for taxes levied by the local government, while 
respondents were more likely to find levies by chiefs or non-state actors to be 
reasonable, because they feel that receive a specific good or service in exchange for 
paying these informal taxes and levies. Furthermore, informal non-state levies are 
perceived by taxpayers to be the most transparent of taxes, with informal chiefdom taxes 
viewed more positively than formal state taxes.  
 Local authorities are key to find effective ways to formalise taxation on the 
informal micro and micro enterprises (Joshi et al., 2014). Associations of enterprises 
in the informal sector are able to tax bargain to pay local taxes in return for specific 
improvements, as Prichard (2015) shows for the case in Ghana. Although the debate is 
mainly focussing on the high cost of tax collection, or the limited tax revenues, the 
mechanism of tax bargaining could be instrumental to increase responsiveness of local 
governments on demands from informal sector actors.  
4. The different contexts of the linkages between taxation 
and accountability 
Although there is enough evidence of positive linkages between taxation and accountability 
(good governance) in LMICs, this does not mean that such outcomes are always guaranteed; 
taxation does not automatically translate into tax bargaining and higher government 
responsiveness and accountability to all citizens and business actors. This has already been 
highlighted in some of the studies mentioned in section 3 of this rapid review (e.g. feeling of 
ownership, level of expectations on quality of public services, awareness and capacities of 
citizens, access to information). This can result in inequalities in reciprocity in exchange for 
paying tax. To cite from Moore, Prichard and Fjeldstad (2018, p.192): 
“The realities of taxation in much of contemporary Africa – particularly at the subnational 
level – frequently appear more conducive to extended periods of coercion rather than to 
the construction of stronger social contracts. In some areas at least, the formal tax 
burdens borne by small firms – often through an array of small levies and fees – are 
larger than those borne by larger firms. … [C]ritically, existing evidence suggests that 
relatively marginalised groups – migrants, ethnic minorities, women, the poor – frequently 
bear the heaviest relative tax burdens but have the most limited capacity to push for 
reciprocity.” 
Research seem to have shifted recently to understand the different contexts in which these 
processes seem to occur. The different social contracts that underpin political power are 
important factors on the success of taxation on accountability. The case study of Prichard (2015) 
on Ghana shows a broad-based tax bargain that resulted in improvements of public services and 
accountability for a broad base of the society. However, the research of Jiboa, Prichard and Van 
den Boogaard (2017) on Sierra Leone, for example, shows the importance of informal chief 
relations as gatekeepers to the expansion of property taxes. This makes the redistribution gains 
of tax bargaining highly dependent on the individual chiefs. Prichard (2015), therefore, comes to 
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with five factors that seem to be particular important in explaining the tax bargaining contexts in 
different countries and regions (see also Table 1): 
 The level of revenue pressure facing governments: Governments with high or urgent 
revenue pressure are more likely to compromise with taxpayers.  
 The potential and scope for tax resistance: Different taxes receive a different 
response from citizens and businesses, depending on the nature of the tax or the political 
strength of the taxpayers. 
 Taxpayer capacity for collective action: Countries that have political space for 
collective mobilisation and organisations to support it. 
 The nature of political institutions for bargaining: What are the different forums for 
taxpayers to organise themselves and make their demands for reciprocity? 
 The political salience of taxation: Awareness of citizens and businesses on paying tax 
and the political importance in combination with access to information creates an 
environment for tax bargaining. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that different tax-compliance attitudes of taxpayers and the 
different contexts that shape tax bargaining, influences the results and explains who benefits 
more from reciprocity than others. Understanding the way in which taxation may contribute to 
shaping state building and accountability demands an openness to the variety of these 
processes, which ultimately could explain how effective interventions are in increasing the link 










5. Lessons learned from taxation interventions 
There is limited literature that reviews existing taxation interventions on how they effectively 
improve accountability. The most ambitious effort to address how to encourage positive links 
between tax and governance in tax policy and supportive development programmes comes 
again from Prichard (2015). As also highlighted in the ICTD Summary Brief (Prichard, 2016) 
interventions should focus on four broad areas for policy action:  
 Enhance the political salience of taxation – including via direct taxes: There are two 
major ways to increase the political salience of taxation. First, strengthen direct taxes, 
including income taxes, property taxes, and presumptive taxes on smaller businesses. 
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Second, work with civil society, the media and other groups to actively raise awareness 
of existing taxes, and support public engagement.  
 Focus on horizontal equity in tax enforcement: Measures like selective tax 
exemptions, or international methods for wealthy taxpayers to avoid taxes, may not only 
be economically damaging, but may also have significant political consequences as it 
harms collective tax bargaining in favour of seeking tax avoidance. Furthermore, 
transparency around taxation and budgeting, including earmarking to increase overall 
popular engagement, should be expanded. Taxpayers have been more willing to pay 
taxes when they have had clear information about the use of that money for popular 
public services.  
 Directly support popular engagement, including the creation of inclusive 
institutional spaces for tax bargaining: Governments and donors can work directly to 
strengthen the scope for bargaining in two broad ways. First, direct support for the types 
of groups that can support broad popular engagement with tax issues, including the 
media, civil society and business associations. Second, the creation of specific 
institutional spaces in which such bargaining can happen. In both cases it is essential 
that these efforts be relatively inclusive, in the sense of involving a wide range of 
taxpayers, and not only larger taxpayers, as there is a significant risk of processes of tax 
bargaining being dominated by these larger taxpayers. If tax bargaining is to be a route to 
broad-based responsiveness and accountability, policy attention needs to be turned to 
how to ensure that such bargaining includes a broader group of taxpayers. 
Flores-Macías (2016) empirical research in Mexico found that provisions of public safety in 
the design of tax features could increase political support for taxation, especially among 
those with low trust in government. The study also shows that features of taxes, such as 
allowing for civil society oversight, sunset provisions that make the duration of taxes finite, and 
earmark mechanisms that direct tax revenue for a specific purpose, affect political support 
positively. Among the low trust group, the effect of earmarks is large and significant, and the 
effect of sunsets is large and barely missing significance. The effect of monitoring by civil society 
is not significant in either group, but the estimate is twice as large in the low trust group. Civil 
society monitoring was only significant among the group with favourable perceptions of the public 
good. This suggests that the design features might be especially effective in reducing uncertainty 
among those who are most sceptical of the government.  
A link can also be made with initiatives that seek transparency and accountability in government 
budgeting. Relevant examples are mechanisms for participatory budgeting, publishing citizens’ 
guides to the budget, and conducting Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (Carlitz, 2013). 
Citizen-led initiatives typically emanate from civil-society organisations or social movements, and 
may operate in concert with the state or in confrontation. Transparency and participatory 
budgeting initiatives mostly focus on the expenditure side of the budget, giving taxpayers 
some spaces to influence budget priorities, in particular on the local level. These include 
gender budgeting initiatives, children’s budgets and other efforts by marginalised groups to 
develop ‘alternative’ budgets that highlight their priorities (Carlitz, 2013). Although most 
participatory budgeting initiatives are from Latin America, Carlitz (2013) mentions several budget 
monitoring initiatives from Africa. For example, Muslims for Human Rights in Kenya have 
engaged in participatory audits, while groups of citizens in South Africa and Tanzania have 
monitored and publicised the results of official government audits. In the short timescale for this 
rapid review, not evidence could be found how these initiatives effectively increased tax-
compliance of citizens resulting in more revenues due to increased trust. All the evidence that is 
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mentioned, looks at spending efficiency and development outcomes related to changing budget 
directions. There is a growing body of evidence that suggests a positive impact on development 
outcomes and budget awareness due to these initiatives (Carlitz, 2013), which might suggest an 
improved tax-compliance as well.  
As Fjeldstad (2013) states, donors and tax practitioners acknowledge the importance of 
increasing tax-compliance through tax bargaining processes as reciprocity for paying taxes. 
However, they have yet to be translated into a clear-cut governance focused tax reform agenda 
in practice. From a state-building perspective broadening the revenue base (e.g. to poorer 
citizens, direct taxes and informal sector) is vital to building the social fiscal contract. It is also 
central to creating an equitable tax regime. Fjeldstad (2013) comes with several ways how this 
could be achieved, which overlap partly with the previous points made by Prichard (2016): 
 Strengthening taxpayers’ rights: An important element of administrative accountability 
is the rights of taxpayers vis-à-vis the tax authority. Though still in their infancy in many 
LMICs, tax appeal boards and tax tribunals are important institutions to secure taxpayers’ 
rights and to establish fair and transparent procedures to address tax disputes. To make 
these institutions accessible for a wider segment of taxpayers, there is a need to simplify 
the procedures for instituting appeals, and to disseminate more accessible information to 
the general public on the roles and functions of the appeal board. 
 Fighting corruption in tax collection: Institutional mechanisms are often established to 
prevent, reveal and curb corruption. However, the critical tasks are to ensure that the 
systems, policies, regulations and procedures are not only established, but also filter 
down throughout the organisation. There also seem to be an endemic tax avoidance 
culture in many tax administrations, and some tax officers seem to encourage or fall 
victim to this culture. Therefore, continuous vigilance on the part of revenue 
administrations’ leadership will be crucial to minimising corruption in tax collection. 
 Engaging with taxpayers to increase taxpayer culture: Many revenue authorities in 
Africa have undertaken vigorous taxpayer education interventions, but they have had a 
limited outreach since most of them have been concentrated in the urban centres. Some 
elites are not interested in tax issues as they regard taxation as a form of coercion and 
one that will erode their privileges. They therefore turn a deaf ear to the taxpayer 
education campaigns of tax administrations. There is no clear answer in the literature 
how to establish a constructive dialogue with elites on taxation and accountability.  
 Securing better links between taxes paid and public service provision: As people 
are more likely to pay taxes if they felt that the government was providing services 
equitably, collecting revenue fairly and using the revenue to provide services, this should 
be the starting point to increase tax compliance. Still, there is a tendency for the revenue 
and expenditure sides of the public finance equation to be treated as separate silos. The 
links between tax payment and public service delivery is generally weak in many LMICs, 
which is reflected in widespread resistance to pay taxes. There may be a strong case for 
the use of tax earmarking in LMICs. From a governance perspective, tax earmarking 
could be a useful strategy to build trust between the state and citizens, achieve important 
revenue and spending objectives, improve monitoring of tax and expenditures, and 
encourage public engagement. 
 Strengthening parliaments’ capacity: The question is whether legislators in poorer 
countries really understand tax policies and the implications of tax reforms for their 
constituents. Through co-ordinated efforts donors should consider providing advice, 
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training and research support to improve the technical capacity and basic skills of 
Members of Parliament in public finance and tax policy. There is also a need to increase 
the time available for scrutiny of the budget proposals.  
 Encouraging civil society engagement: Civil society actors are likely to be crucial 
intermediaries in fostering state-society bargaining around taxation. An important 
opportunity for building political support for reform lies in more emphasis on the ‘demand 
side’, i.e. in building broader citizen engagement around taxation. Through co-ordinated 
efforts, donors should consider to enhance their support to domestic civil society 
organizations engaged on tax issues. There is also demand for technical assistance to 
building tax capacity/knowledge in the business communities, especially for small and 
medium enterprises. 
From the literature on property taxes on local level, the results point toward two sets of important 
messages for policy makers (Prichard, Jibao & Orgeira, forthcoming). 
 Governments have nothing to fear from tax reform if it is paired with improved 
transparency and public services: Local governments frequently express reservations 
about pursuing property tax reform precisely because it may spark taxpayer mobilisation, 
tax resistance or declining trust in government. The evidence shows the opposite, while 
there is an expansion of political knowledge, and the emergence of more conditional 
attitudes toward tax compliance, there is less large-scale political mobilisation nor a 
broad loss of trust in government.  
 Combining tax reforms with communication efforts: Research shows that there are 
good reasons to believe that increased political knowledge, and increasingly conditional 
views of tax compliance may be linked in part to the strong emphasis on taxpayer 
education, and tax expenditure linkages, in the roll out of property tax reform 
programmes. Communications efforts would be expected to contribute directly to the 
political knowledge, and expanded expectations of reciprocity.  
Another forthcoming study on Ghana and Sierra Leone (Prichard et al., forthcoming) is in line 
with these lessons. It shows that achieving meaningful transparency depends on a clear 
communication, which is timely, actionable and communicated in accessible native 
languages. Furthermore, there are limits for official publications, while radio and interactive 
forms of information are more important. Also, efforts should go to the forums where tax 
bargaining can happen, often shaped with support from civil society and grassroot organisations. 
Prichard et al (forthcoming) shows that instead of seeking to identify the ‘best’ type of forum it is 
more important to build effective forums for engagement, which include three elements: 
 Effective forums need to be perceived as safe and secure spaces for engagement; 
 Effective forums need to be viewed as sincere and open spaces for genuine discussion; 
 Effective forums can often be enhanced by engagement with non-state authorities, 
including chiefs, religious leaders or other community leaders. 
Overall the literature shows that to measure such improvements in accountability can be 
achieved by looking at changes in popular levels of political knowledge, political engagement and 
attitudes towards tax compliance.  
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